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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH and
MARGARET REEVES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.

-v-

14511

RAY WILLIS REEVES,
Defendant and Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, State of Utah, and Margaret B. Reeves,
appeal in part from a judgment rendered against the Respondent
on an order to show cause in re temporary support entered in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah denying Appellant reimbursement for the total sum
of assistance payments expended for co-plaintiff and awarding
judgment for child support at the rate of $55.00 per month.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted judgment to the State of Utah
for child support based on the amount of $55.00 per month less
payments but held that the State of Utah could not enforce the
past duty for wife support under the divorce proceedings and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the
-2-

State of Utah was not entitled to collect support under the
duty of support laws without a prior court order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's
holding that the State of Utah cannot collect wife support
funds for past support without a prior order of the court,
the court's ruling that prior wife support could not be included
under the divorce proceeding, and Appellants seek reversal
of the court's ruling that support judgments be pro-rated on
the welfare grant amounts with a request that the matter be
remanded for the lower court to determine whether the $55.00
basis is reasonable or whether the defendant was capable of
paying more for the support of his child.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves, following her
marriage of August 16, 1974, separated from her husband Ray
W. Reeves on or about the 14th of October, 1974. On December 18,
1974, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against defendant
in which she sought a divorce from him.

(R.l-2)

Because of

defendant's failure to provide support for his wife and child,
plaintiff was forced to rely on public assistance payments from
January, 1975 through January, 1976.

(R.17-18)

On June 20,

1975, a child was born to plaintiff.

An assignment of

collection was executed on July 15, 1975 pursuant to Utah Code
-3-

Annotated §78-45-9 by which plaintiff's rights to support
were subrogated to those of the Department of Social Services.
(R.12)

Defendant was notified in August, 1975, that plaintiff

was receiving public assistance.

Other than a token payment

of $37.50 in September, 1975, paid to the Department of
Social Services (R.17), defendant at no time made any attempt
to discharge his financial obligations to his wife or child
as far as the record involved shows.
A hearing was held on February 20, 1976, on the
Utah State Department of Social Services' order to show cause
in re temporary support and motion for a judgment against the
defendant.

Under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9, as amended,

granting the State derivative rights to seek reimbursement
from obligors, the State requested judgment for the total
sum of $2,418.00 given to support defendant's wife and child.
(R.19)

The lower court granted judgment against defendant

in favor of the Utah State Department of Social Services for
the sum of $457.50 for unpaid child support and based its
finding on the amount of $55.00 per month or the difference
between a welfare grant of one person and two persons (R.16)
and denied the State judgment for assistance payments given
defendant's wife without prior order of the court.

Based upon

stipulation of all counsel a prospective temporary child
support order was entered for $50.00 per month based on defendant's
-4-

present circumstances (R.22).
Appellants appeal in part the order of the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

A HUSBAND'S DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE
MAY BE PURSUED UNDER DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
This present action, of which the State of Utah is
involved because of welfare payments, involves a situation
where the entire period of separation outside of a few days
has taken place after the filing of a verified complaint for
divorce.

After the complaint was filed, the co-plaintiff

below applied for and began receiving public assistance.
Based on the fact that neither party appeared to
be moving forward in the action and that no temporary order
of either wife or child support was established, the State of
Utah joined as a party (R.13) to enforce the statutory duty
of Utah Code Annotated §78-4 5-3 for both the wife and child.
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of State of Utah and Margo
Bartholomew

v.

Bartholomew

P.2d

(filed March 22,

19 76) held that the State of Utah was a proper party in interest
based on the fact that support was being rendered and was
therefore a proper party to divorce proceedings.
Neither Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3, nor Bartholomew,
id., require separate actions to enforce support duties.

As

in this case, juridisction over the parties became firm upon
-5-

service of the summons and complaint on the defendant (R.7).
As such, the entire support reimbursement asked for in the
action below, except for the month of January, 1975, was for
a period of time after the divorce proceedings commenced.
It is the position of Appellants that once the
complaint for divorce is filed and served, that the court
has authority not only to enter a temporary support order
under the divorce laws, and divorce proceedings, but can also
enter a judgment for accrued and unpaid child support arrearages
based on the statutory language cited above under the same
divorce proceedings.

The lower court refused to grant such

a judgment and indicated in lanugage in open court that the
State would have to file a separate action (T.18), while in
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.25),
the court states that the defendant has no duty to reimburse
the State of Utah for money expended for the woman without a
prior court order. Under which action the duty is enforced
seems irrevelant to the more important position that the duty
to support is enforced.

It appears to Appellants that if

pursuing under the divorce action would simplify and "clean
up" the entire process, that method should be pursued.
The duty exists by law, and it appears to be more
sensible, economical, judicial, to have all support matters
under one action where possible.
-6-

The Appellants therefore

ask this court to permit enforcement of this statutory duty
under the divorce proceedings.
POINT II
A HUSBAND IN THE STATE OF UTAH HAS A
DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE BOTH BY
STATUTE AND COMMON LAW
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3 states:

"Every man

shall support his wife and child." This language seems clear
enough, but the lower court seems to have added the following
language:

"Every man shall support his wife and child when

the court says so,"

The statute as it presently appears is

not a conditional statute but is a positive command and statement of legislative intent.

If at any time the "husband" does

not support his "family" he is in contravention to this
statutory requirement.

If the legislature wanted to make this

duty conditional on a court order, it seems only apparent that
it would have said so.

The lower court is not given the

prerogative to do away with this obligation simply under the
guise that no judicial determination has been made for the
period claimed.
This statutory duty has been summarized in 41 Am
Jur 2d §356 as follows:
"If a husband is guilty of misconduct
which results ina.Spouse!s separating, and
the wife has no adequate provision for
her support, the husband is liable for
necessaries others have furnished to her.
The husband is guilty of such misconduct
-7-

where he has deserted his wife, turned
her away, or treated her with such
cruelty that she has been compelled to
leave him."
This court has recognized the duty and responsibility
to support wives and families long before the statute quoted
above was enacted (1957).

In the case of Snow v. Snow 13 Utah

15, 43 P.620 (1896), this court said:
"Any man attaining his majority, who
voluntarily enters into the marital
relation, should be willing to assume
those ordinary and responsible obligations
of a husband which naturally follow and
attend such relation. These duties of the
husband require hin to provide the wife and
children with a reasonable maintenance
during the continuance of that relation;
and, in case of separation and divorce
occasioned by his own fault, he should
not complain that the duties so assumed
should remain a continuing obligation
upon his part." (Emphasis a^dded)

In the recent case of Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d
141 (1974) the Supreme Court of Utah held that a third party's
right to reimbursement for support supplied to a child from
the failure of the parent to furnish support, belongs to whoever
furnishes the support.

The court said:

"... suppose a father (parent) fails over
a period of time to furnish support of the
child, and the mother, or someone else,
furnishes it. That person then has the
right to claim reimbursement from the parent,
the same as any other past debt. This
right of reimbursement belongs to whoever
furnished the support; and it is subject
to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction
or discharge in the same manner as any
other debt." (Emphasis added) at P. 143.
-8-

Here, though wife

support is the point at issue, Appellants

point out to the court that the statutory duty upon which this
appeal is based states specifically:
"Every man shall support his wife
and child."
It appears consistent with the above case to say:
...Suppose a husband fails over a
period of time to furnish support of
his wife, and someone else furnishes
it. That person has the right to claim
reimbursement from the husband, the same
as any other past debt...
No distinction can be seen between the support of the wife or
child when under the statute both may expect that support.

Until

a divorce decree is entered or the marriage is annuled, there
exists this right of a third party to collect current support
and to collect back amounts already expended.
This right of a private party to hold a husband
liable for necessaries furnished a wife has not only been long
established, but

has been extended to public authorities.

Howard v. Whetstone Township, 10 Ohio 365 (1841); Hannover v.
Turner, 14 Mass. 227 (1817). For example, where a woman becomes
a public charge, the money required for. her support can be
recovered from the husband by suit of the party who had made
the advances.
846 (1947) :

More recently Sellman v. Sellman, 185 P.2d
"The husband assumes responsibility for the

support of his family and upon his failure to provide such
support his wife is authorized to purchase on his credit
-9-

whatever is necessary for her maintenance.11
Though counsel for respondent attached some importance
to the pendency of divorce and plaintiff's waiver of alimony,
the fact that a husband and wife have marital difficulties .
"...or that one of them has filed an action for divorce does
not change the marital relationship.

The parties remain

husband and wife until a divorce decree is granted."

Fisher

v. Taler, 401 P.2d 1012, 194 Kan 701 (19651).
In an early Georgia case, Mitchel v. Treanor 11 Ga.
326 (1852) the court held that a decree of divorce subsequent
to a period of separation had no effect or^ the previously
accrued liability of a husband for necessaries furnished to
his wife by a third party.

The court said the husband was not:

"...relieved from liability by the
subsequent provision made by the court
and jury for past alimony, the goods
having been previously delivered."
The Montana Supreme Court in Murphy v. Murphy 134
Mont. 594, 335 P.2d 296 (1959) discussed the permanence and
importance of this duty of "wife-support" when a sufficient
showing of need for support was made.

The court stated:

"...regardless of any prior statements
of claim of self-sufficiency of the wife,
this could not operate as a perpetual
release of the husband of the duty and
responsibility under the law to care for
his wife and family..."
Certainly, the fact that a womari ana/or children are
on public assistance gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
that a woman is in need.
-10-

Thus, the duty of the husband to support his wife
is not only "real", but the State of Utah is entitled to
enforce that duty against a husband in absence of prior court
order until the decree of divorce is final if seiid "wife" is
drawing public assistance for her support.

Though husband

and wife might no longer be compatible, or desertion, or cruelty
has taken place, such does not obviate the husband's obligation
to furnish support when no divorce has been granted.
Since the entire time the wife was receiving public
assistance is covered after the divorce complaint was filed,
the State should be able to enforce this duty under the divorce
number instead of suing separately.

Such is only feasible since

the numbers of actions are limited as well as having all
matters pertaining to the divorce and separation under one
case.
The duty not only exists, but the State of Utah is
entitled to enforce that duty under the divorce action.
POINT III
A HUSBAND'S DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE
IS ENFORCEABLE INDEPENDENT OF ANY
COURT ORDER.
The statutory duty and obligation disucssed under
Point II, above, negates any necessity for again establishing
a duty of support by court order before that duty can be
enforced.

As defined in Utah Code Annotated §77-61a-2(f):
-11-

11

'Duty of support1 includes any duty of
support imposed or imposable by law, or
by any court order, decree, or judgment,
whether interlocutory or final, whether
incidental to a proceeding for divorce,
legal separation, separate maintenance
or otherwise." (Emphasis added)
The duty of support, being enforceable either by
law or by court order, cannot, therefore, be made contingent
upon an order of the court.

In the court below, there was

confusion as to this very point.

In Point 5 of its "Conclusions

of Law", the court stated that "the defendant has no duty to
reimburse the Utah State Department of Social Services for
public assistance paid to the plaintiff fc(r and on behalf of
the plaintiff without a prior order of thq court."

Appellants

claim this is contrary to the statutory provision cited
immediately before which says that the dui^y can be enforced
by law (meaning suit for back funds already expended) or by
court order (meaning orders already established to govern the
conduct of the parties).

The court on pa^e 18 of the transcript

of the hearing said that the State could come in under a separate
action for prior support.

Appellants cannot see how counsel

for defendant, or the court itself, could prepare and sign
Conclusions of Law different than what the court actually said.
It should further be pointed out that though
was denied for past payments given to the wife

reimbursement
because of the

lack of a court order, it should be noted that despite the lack
-12-

of a prior court order, a judgment on back support was awarded
in behalf of the child.
court.

This shows the confusion of the lower

Under one portion of the statute imposing a duty of

support the court grants judgment without a prior court order
and turns around and denies the same relief for a wife under
the other half of the statute.
That the Department of Social Services has the right
to so intervene is established by Bartholomew, supra, as well
as Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9.
Section 9 makes no direct mention of a support order ,
because the purpose of 78-45-3, supra, is to establish an
enforceable statutory duty of support.

This then obviates

the necessity of going to court to get an order before an
obligee is able to enforce a right of support in Utah either
for current or past amounts due.
This rationale

is supported by Commissioners1

statements about the purpose of the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, of which 78-45-3 and 9 are part; and also by
William Brockelbank in his now famous treatise, Interstate
Enforcement of Family Support, 2nd Edition.

In the Commissioners1

Prefatory Note to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
they enunciate as a basic purpose of the act the establishment
of a statutory duty of support to be used in conjunction
with URESA.

(U.C.A. Matr., Fam. and Health Laws 133). The

famous act was passed to eliminate confusion among
-13-

lawyers

who believed URESA was unenforceable without a court order
declaring a duty of support.

Commenting on this Brockelbank

said:
".../I/t is suprising to find /such/
misconceptions. One such is that only
orders of support of one state will be
enforced in another under the Act. In
fact it is 'all duties', and the dutyf
of course, may grow out of the order of
support or a judgment or decree but is
equally a duty if it never has received
judicial attention and now is the basis
of litigation for the first time under
the Act." (Emphasis added)
Brockelbank and Infansto, Interstate Enforcement of
Family Support, 2nd ed. , 1971, p. 39. Thes|e "all duties" spoken
of by Brockelbank encompases not only courtt orders of support,
but statutory (such as 78-45-3) and commoq law duties of support
as well.
Thus, Utah Code Annotated §78-45-3 establishing a
statutory right of support for both children and wives and
§78-45-9 Utah Code Annotated (1957) gives the obligee the right
to enforce this duty of support.

Read together, there is no

need to establish again by court order a duty of support before
such duty can be enforced, but solely to determine the amount
owed, if the husband has not fulfilled his duty.
California, with a support statute similar to Utah's
law, in Los Angeles County v. Frisbie 122 P.2d 526, 19 Cal
634 (1942):
"As so employed, these worfds, referable
to the recoupment of sums already paid,
indicate the legislature's intention
-14-

by this enactment to provide an ordinary
cause of action for the recovery of
money and negative the requirement of
a judicial decree to determine the
measure of the debt as the maintenance
of such action,lf (Emphasis added)
The language of the court is too clear to be mistaken:
when the support obligation is established by statute, there
is no need to go into court and get a court order prior to
an action for reimbursement based on the statute.

The burden

must be on the defendant-husband to show that the amount
claimed for reimbursement is unreasonable.

Hence, there is

a hearing on liability either pre or post decree to determine
liability.

Such is not determined by arbitrary methods to

"drain" the pockets of delinquent husbands/fathers.
The duty of wife support is constant whereas the
liability is variable - being dependent on circumstances.

As

an example of the inequity of the lower court's position
Appellants submit the following hypothetical:
Two sets of parents with the same
number of children separate at the same
time. One husband earns $5,000.00 a
year and is ordered under a separation
agreement to pay $100.00 per month
support for wife and children. The
second husband earns $20,000.00 a
year but that couple obtains no court
ordered support arrangement. Both
couples remain separated for one year
before a divorce is decreed.
For this court to say that the man earning $5,000.00
must support his family solely

becuase of the court order

and then say that the man earning four times as rauch need not
-15-

support his family or reimburse what has been expended solely
because there is no court order is totally inconsistent.

If

such a position be upheld, it is invidious discrimination
against any one with enough sense to get legal counsel to
protect his interests.

In essence, the lower court is saying:

"If you can hide from the clutches of the court, there is
no duty."
The lower court said:
".•.I don't think that the State Welfare
Department can simply start paying her
welfare and say, 'Even though a court
hasn't decided what the duty of support
is and even though there is no court
order with respect to this, this is
what the court must make him pay.'"
(T.ll) (Emphasis added)
The State never claimed that the court must grant
judgment for the amount of money expended by welfare, but did
say that the burden is on the defendant to show that the amount
claimed due and owing for reimbursement is inappropriate and
unjustified under the circumstances.

In essence, if the

defendant only earns $200.00 net per month, and welfare
expends $300.00 per month for his dependents, it would seem
unreasonable to grant judgment for the $300.00. The order to
show cause before the court was an order for the defendant to
show cause why judgment for the amount cl|aimed is not appropriate•
All this would entale is taking testimony and making a record
as to the husband's ability to support during the period of
-16-

time claimed.

The court then determines what the "reasonable"

support arrearage should be Eor that period of time.

Appellants

point out the criteria listed under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7
whereby such a determination is made.

In the instant case,

the lower court not only says the defendant has no

burden to

show the amount claimed is unreasonable, but that there is
no enforceable duty.
to support.

This is gross error.

A wife has a right

When a woman go€>s on public assistance, the

enforcement of that right to support shifts to the State of Utah
under Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9 and other provisions of
§78-45b-l et.seq. as incorporated into Title 78-45.

If the man

can forgo that right by simply not paying, or not allowing
a court to establish an order of support by refraining from
being served with process, this entire area of the law is
twisted out of proportions and in essence makes the law a
nullity.
This court said in Kimball v. Grantsville 19 Utah
368 (1899):
Independently of any repugnance
between statute and any constitutional
provision, court has no power to
arrest statute's execution however
unwise or unjust, in opinion of court,
statute may be, or whatever motives
may have led to its enactment.
In the instant case, the lower court is not only arresting
the execution of the statute, but in essence does away with it in mocking gesture - until jurisdiction is obtained over the
-17-

person of the husband.

For example, if a husband/father

removes himself from the confines of this state and travels
to another, or cannot be found to be served, there is no way
to get personal jurisdiction over him to establish an order
of support.

Such is an inducement to anyone with sense at

all to hide out - to forgo being responsible for support.
The legislature intended the duty of wife support
to be established without question.

To reiterate this

importance, which is incorporated into Utah Code Annotated
§78-45-1 et. seg., the Utah legislature enacted Utah Code
Annotated §7 8-45b-2 which provides:
"Every obligor shall be deemed to
have received notice of the rights
of the department by his failure to
provide and the obligee's receipt
of support."
Thus, the legislature assumes, and makes its intent
clear that from day one of separation, the husband (if the
obligor) is on notice that he has to support his dependents
and if the Department of Social Services gives out aid, the
obligor owes the support to the State for reimbursement.
Appellants feel the law is clear enough.
The court further infers in its statements on the
record that the Department of Social Services is telling the
court what has to be reimbursed, ie. what was expended by
welfare.

As explained under Point IV of the argument, the
-18-

legilature has established a "minimum household needs budget".
Thus, there is a presumption in the law that that amount is
a reasonable amount for necessary support.
not arrived
study.

Such an amount is

at arbitrarily or capriciously, but by intense

The court has the authority and power to review that

presumption by the rebuttle of the delinquent parent/husband.
If it appears to the court that the amount claimed is reasonable
under the circumstances, the legislative intent and findings
should be honored.

In this instant case, the court didn't

even attempt to search out the circumstances and thus erred
in its procedure.
As the problems of desertion and divorce multiply,
it becomes increasingly important that everything possible be
done to encourage the proper discharge of marital and parental
duties.

With the desertion or nonsupport of the male bread-

winner, the State generally has no choice but that of rendering
assistance.

This assistance imposes a burden upon the citizenry

and the welfare agencies - it is only fair that the individual
responsible for bringing misery and misfortune to their
families be held financially liable therefore.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT DUE AND
OWING FOR THE CHILD OF THE PARTIES
WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
GRANT FOR ONE AND THE GRANT
-19-

FOR TWO PEOPLE WITHOUT SOME
FACTUAL SUBSTANTIATION THAT SAID
AMOUNT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
Perhaps the statement of the trial court as found
in the transcript of the hearing at page 16 deliniates the
controversy here presented:
"The Court:...and I don't agree that
when they increase it from $144 to $199
because she has a child, then the
obligation of the child support is onehalf of the $199 instead of the additional
amount.,f
In essence, the court arbitrarily held that the child support
claimed could not exceed the difference between the grant for
one person ($144) and the grant for two (£199).

With this,

.Appellants take issue.
The intent of the legislature is expressed in
tJ.C.A.

55-15a-18. The language refers tp grants to "assistance

households".

By reference to "assistance households", the

legislation makes clear that the needs of the family as a
w hole are to be examined as opposed to those of individual
members.

While it is true that assistance is awarded on a

prorated basis according to the number of individuals within
a family, this is but a means of complying with strict budgetary
requirements in insuring that a "family unit" has a grant
conducive to the needs of all members of the unit.
The aforementioned Utah Code Section clearly sets forth
the

constraints under which assistance is granted:
-20-

"Assistance grants for or in behalf
of any one household in any one month
shall be determined as follows:
(l)The office shall develop a
standard budget which reflects the
minimum needs of assistance households.
The standard budget shall be adjusted
annually to reflect changes upward
or downward in the costs of living and
filed with the governor and with the
legislative appropriations committee
annually. The standard budget is the
basis for determination of monthly
assistance grants to recipient households for each fiscal year the legislature appropriates funds." (Emphasis
added)
This amount for "households" is established by the Utah
legislature as part of its budget.

That budget is based on

grants for the size of "units" which in turn is based on the
number within the unit.

The legislative enactment of the

present "needs budget" is found in the Laws of Utah, 1975/
Chapter 216, Item 159, page 1069:
"a. That Public Assistance grants for
fiscal year 1976 be set at a level not
to exceet 77 percent of the Summer 1974
Needs Budget."
Thus, the Department of Social Services is to look
to the whole family in making its determination of need.

By

focusing on the family, the legislature has recognized the
essential equality of each family member.

In effect, what the

lower court has done is to make a value judgment as to the
worth of the child as compared to the mother.
-21-

It is arbitrary

and discriminatory to hold that one member is worth $144.00,
the second worh $55.00, and the third stil|l less because of
proportioning. Though pro-rated, all membqrs are none-the-less
equal - the total assistance rendered is c^iven for the use
of all family members.

The lower court's holding thus removes

emphasis from the family and discriminates as to amounts to
be given each individual.
Since welfare payments provide for "minimum needs"
only, the amount ordered to be paid by th£ court seems all the
more unreasonable.

Welfare payments, as

contrasted to child

support payments, are frequently the only means of support available
to a family.

To further reduce this amount that family members

could receive, might well result in payments which fall below
the "minimum needs" standard.

When determining the needs of

children, as in the instant case, the policy of the law is not
that of taking as much away from them as possible, but to render
all assistance which the law allows.
The pro-rated "Needs Budget" is based on the
presumption that no matter how large the family, there are
certain "necessary expenses" such as rent, lights, gas, etc.,
which are needed for one person as well as 10 people.

The

per person expense on such costs is generally less as the
family gets larger, bringing about less need for money to
provide a minimum standard as purported by the statute
previously cited.
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There is no evidence in the record, or transcript
of the hearing that anything was presented to the court to
affirm its position that the amount of support for the child
was $55.00.

Appellants claim that for a grant $199.00, both

the mother and child benefited equally raising the presumption
that he owes $99.50 or one half of the grant amount.

The

fact that a current child support order was stipulated to in
the amount of $50.00 is irrevelant to the question here'raised
as to whether the defendant-respondent was capable during the
pre hearing period of paying one-half of the grant amount
which is the child's share of the "household's needs'1. In
fact there might be circumstances where a child receives much
more benefit than the mother.

Who is to say that the mother

is the first person on the grant and the child is second.

If

there are two children on the grant with the mother not receiving
aid, does that mean the one child is worth $144.00 and the
other child is only worth $55.00.

The Appellants say no.

Because minimum needs only are allowed for, there
should be no reduction of the sums provided for destitute
children unless a close examination of the circumstances
clearly shows that the full amount available was not necessary.
The lower court erred in determining the amount owed for the
child.

This case should therefore be remanded for a hearing

to determine whether the respondent-father was capable of
paying more - up to one-half the welfare grant - for the child*s
support during the separation period.
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CONCLUSION
Both the law and reason prescribe Appellant's
position that prior court orders are not needed before the
duty of "wife-support" is enforceable.

further, the lower

court's position to pro-rate the worth of family members is
inappropriate when the welfare of family units is concerned.
Therefore, Appellants urge thi$ court to sustain
Appellant's position and remand this cas^ to the lower
court for enforcement and judgment for monies owed the wife
under the divorce proceedings, and to review the ability
of the defendant-respondent to reimburse for child support.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant attorney General
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